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PICKETING AND CLOSED SHOP STATUS

THE TEXAS MASS PICKETING AND CLOSED SHOP
STATUTES OF 1947
I.
T

HE picket line has long been a favorite weapon of labor groups
in economic contests with employers for a larger share of the
products of industry and for amelioration of conditions of employment. The popularity of picketing among labor union strategists stems from its effectivness in enlisting public support in
enforcing a boycott against a particular employer or business.
Picketing can be carried on without unreasonable expense and
without the active participation of a large number of personnel.
The greatest advantage of picketing lies in its flexibility. Since
the pickets need not be employees of the business being picketed,
picketing is the device most commonly used to introduce union
organization in industries where little or no unionization has previously taken place. The public recognition today afforded to
picketing as lawful and commonplace union activity gives little
indication of the judicial hostility toward picketing that existed
in the United States less than two decades ago.
The coercive aspects of picketing and its use as a device for
the intentional infliction of financial injury to business interests
have caused the courts, historically committed to the protection
of property rights, to regard this labor activity as anathema.
Early decisions reflect this attitude in holding picketing to be
illegal per se either on the theory that picketing is inherently
intimidatory or that from its very nature picketing tends to provoke violence and breaches of the peace.' As recently as 1940 a
substantial number of jurisdictions maintained this view of picketing without consideration of its purpose and without regard to
II

Tmuui, LABoR DisPumS AND COLLFTIVE BARGAINING § 112 (1940).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2

whether or not it was carried on in conjunction with a strike.2
However, the trend of judicial decision in the late thirties was
that picketing was merely a prima facie tort and was privileged
if conducted in a lawful manner and for a lawful purpose. This
doctrine provided a fertile field for the development of rules of
conduct in labor disputes in which consideration could be given
to matters of public policy and social well-being and a balancing
of interests achieved. The advantages of dealing with problems
arising out of picketing according to the principles of tort law
have been recognized.' However, the application of tort doctrines
to picketing has been complicated and inhibited by decisions of
the United States Supreme Court identifying peaceful picketing
with the right of free speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
The first identification of picketing with free speech by the
United States Supreme Court occurred in a dictum by Justice
Brandeis in 1937 in the case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective
Union.' The fruits of the identification were not garnered by labor
until 1940 when the Supreme Court decided the cases of Thornhill v. Alabama' and Carlson v. California.' In both cases penal
statutes categorically prohibiting picketing were held unconstitutional as violative of the right of free speech. The Court particularly objected to the broad language of the statutes.'
While foredooming attempts by the states to prohibit all picketing, the Court in the Thornhill case recognized the power of the
states to regulate picketing and indicated a criterion for the exercise of that power.
"Id. § 117, n. 41.
Id. § 111, n. 43; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 775 (1938).
4 Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARv. L. REv. 180, 204 (1942).
301 U. S. 468, 478 (1937).
6 310 U. S.88 (1940).
7310 U. S. 106 (1940).
8See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 96-98 (1940) ; Carlson v. California, 310
U. S. 106, 112 (1940). For a later indication that broad prohibitions of picketing are
especially objectionable see Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 295
(1943).
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"The power and duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve
the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives and the property of its
residents cannot be doubted. But no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy can be thought
to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the
premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute
involving the latter. We are not now concerned with picketing en masse
or otherwise conducted which might occasion such imminent and aggravated danger as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover the precise
situation giving rise to the danger." (Italics supplied.)'

Picketing having been established as a constitutional right,
the result of the case of American Federationof Labor v. Swing"0
was not surprising. Swing had secured an injunction prohibiting
all picketing of his shop by virtue of the common law policy of
Illinois which forbade picketing in any case where there was not
a proximate relation of employer and employee between the
pickets and the picketed employer. The United States Supreme
Court, especially condemning the broad language of the injunction, held that it was beyond the constitutional power of a state
court to enjoin peaceful picketing merely because of the lack of
an immediate employer-employee dispute. Justice Frankfurter,
writing the opinion of the Court, stated:
"Such a ban is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech.
That a state has ample power to regulate the local problems thrown up
by modern industry is axiomatic. But not even these essential powers are
unfettered by the Bill of Rights. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the
wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether these limits
be defined by statutes or by the judicial organ of the state." ' I

It would appear from this statement that the Court regarded
picketing as completely identified with free speech and immune
from state regulation. And yet on the same day that the Swing
decision was handed down the Supreme Court decided the case
of Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,' which
9 310 U. S. 88v 105 (1940).
10312 U. S. 312 (1941).
11 Id. at 325.
123 U. S. 287 (1941).
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upheld an injunction against all picketing and recognized the
power of the state to prevent coercion in conjunction with picketing. The Meadowmoor Dairies case qualified the doctrine of the
Swing case by upholding an injunction against peaceful picketing
conducted in a setting of violence so that "it could justifiably be
concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past violence
would survive even though future picketing might be wholly
peaceful."'
While the Meadowmoor Dairies case is significant as a recognition that peaceful picketing is not in all circumstances beyond the
regulatory power of the states, it gave little indication that the
Supreme Court considered peaceful picketing as anything more
or less than free speech. The first hint of a retreat from the complete identification of picketing with free speech is found in the
case of Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl," in which
Justice Jackson writing the majority opinion, declared:
"A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances
even peaceful picketing by an individual.""-

Also indicative of a new attitude toward peaceful picketing
is the statement of Justice Douglas in the concurring opinion:
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective
of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation."";

Any doubts that the Supreme Court's attitude toward picketing
since the Swing case were confirmed by the five-to-four decision
inthe case of Carpenter and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe." Here
defendant building trades union picketed plaintiff's cafe because
'e had contracted with a non-union contractor for the construc" Id. at 294.

14315 U.S.769 (1942).
5Id. at 775.
16 Id. at 776.
17 315 U. S. 722 (1942)

PICKETING AND CLOSED SHOP STATUS

tion of a building a mile and a half away from the cafe. The
record showed no connection between the cafe and the building,
and an injunction was granted by a Texas court. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed on the theory that a state might properly
confine picketing to the area of the industry within which the labor
dispute arose. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, stated:
"As a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute, peaceful
picketing may be a phase of free utterance. But recognition of peaceful
picketing as an exercise of free speech does not imply that the states
must be without power to confine the sphere of communication to that
directly related to the dispute. Restriction of picketing to the area of the
industry within which a labor dispute arises leaves open to the disput-

ants other traditional means of communication."'' 8
Justice Reed, in a dissenting opinion based on the view that
the right of free speech was abridged, also recognized that the
states were not without power to regulate peaceful picketing:
"We do not doubt the right of the state to impose not only some but
many restrictions upon peaceful picketing. Reasonable numbers, quietness, truthful placards. open ingress and egress, suitable hours, or other
proper limitations not destructive of the right to tell of labor difficulties

may be required."' 9
In summation it can be said that the United States Supreme
Court has to some extent withdrawn from the position of completely identifying peaceful picketing with free speech. While
broad prohibitions of picketing are almost certain to be held unconstitutional, the Court has repeatedly recognized the power of
the states to regulate picketing and has indicated that a state need
not tolerate peaceful picketing in all circumstances even by a
;ingle individual. It is evident from the holding in the Ritter's
cafe case that the states are not required to assume the onerous
ask of proving a "clear and present danger" to life, property, or
he right of privacy in order to regulate peaceful picketing. Thereore, a statute narrowly drawn to meet a specific evil may be
isId.at 727.
19Id. at 738.
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constitutional. Accepting this thesis as a criterion for state regulation of picketing, it is appropriate to consider the Texas Mass
Picketing Statute"0 of 1947 in order to make some observations
with respect to its application and constitutionality.
II.
The preamble of the Texas Mass Picketing Statute declares that
picketing is more than mere dissemination of ideas in that it is
also a means of coercion, c.ften attended by conduct inimical to
the public welfare, and at times is used against business concerns
having no connection with the labor dispute out of which the
picketing arose. While acknowledgment is made that the freedoms
of speech and assemblage need protection, it is asserted that there
is equal necessity for regulation of picketing in order to preserve
the general safety and welfare. These statements reveal a legislative awareness of recent United States Supreme Court decisions
and indicate an attempt to achieve a balacing of social interests justifying restrictions designed to remedy specific evil3.
The abuses prohibited by this statute are: picketing en masse,
intimidatory and defamatory language in conjunction with picketing to induce breach of collective bargaining contracts, and the
advertisement of continued picketing after it has been enjoined.
Section 1 of the statute deals with mass picketing. The terms
"picket" and "picketing" are defined in very comprehensive
terms. Picketing includes the posting of persons in behalf of an
organization for the purpose of persuading others not to enter or
patronize the picketed premises or for other enumerated purposes.
Mass picketing is prohibited and is defined as picketing in which
there are more than two pickets within fifty feet of any other
picket or within fifty feet of any entrance to the premises being
picketed. 1 Also prohibited is the obstruction of free ingress and
20

TEL REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's Supp. 1947), Art. 5154d.

Although this limitation in number seems rather severe many courts have indicated
that this restriction is not unreasonable. See e.g., Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local 802
Y.Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 775 (1942) (by implication) ; Local Unio, No. 3871 United Steel
21
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egress to the picketed premises by the pickets personally, by their
automobiles, or by any other barrier.
Much can be said in favor of a limitation of the number of
persons engaged in picketing activities. Courts have long regarded
the mere presence of a large number of pickets as intimidation
per se.2 " Another reason advanced for restrictions upon mass
picketing is that the probability of violence increases in proportion to the number of pickets employed."' Acts of violence by
irresponsible individuals are more likely when large numbers of
pickets are congregated at the scene of a labor dispute because
control by union officials and local law enforcement agencies is
rendered more difficult. A great danger inherent in mass picketing is the possibility that mob violence and rioting may result.
These factors considered, it can hardly be said that a statutory
prohibition of mass picketing which allows a sufficient number
of pickets to advertise the existence of a labor dispute is an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the state.
The contention most commonly advanced in opposition to prohibitions of mass picketing is that such restriction deprives the
pickets of the freedoms of speech and assembly. Courts have
almost uniformly held that a limitation of the number of pickets
does not abridge these fredoms. 4 Although the United States
Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the constitutionality of a
state statute forbidding mass picketing, there are many dicta in
leading Supreme Court cases indicating that such a statute would
Workers v. Fortner, 42 S. E. (2d) 734 (Ga. S. Ct. 1947) ; Vim Electric Co. v. Retail
Employee's Union, 128 N. J. Eq. 450,16 A. (2d) 798 (Ch. Ct. 1940).
22 1 TELLeR, op. cit. supra note 1, H 124.125.
23 See Allen and Huck v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, 1 C. C.
H. LAB. CAs. No. 18,029 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1937); Isolantite v. United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, 22 A. (2d) 796 (N. J. Ch. Ct. 1941).
24 E.g., United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235
(D. C. Conn. 1946) ; United States Electrical Motors v. United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, 166 P. (2d) 921 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1946) ; Local Union No. 3871
United Steel Workers v. Fortner, 42 S. E. (2d) 734 (Ga. S. Ct. 1947) ; Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 139 N. J. Eq. 91, 49 A.
(2d) 896 (Ct. Err. and App. 1946).
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be held constitutional."' It seenis clear that picketing en masse is
not regarded as peaceful and within the constitutional guaranty
of free speech. Nor is there any constitutional right involved in
the prohibition of interference with free ingress and egress by
pickets, and there is no possibility that such a penal law will be
found objectionable.
The second and third sections of the statute forbid intimidating, slanderous, or libelous language in conjunction with picketing. The constitutionality of these sections may be maintained on
grounds similar to those supporting prohibition of mass picketing.
But a court may not apply too broadly the concepts of libel and
slander. 8
Section 4 prohibits all picketing to secure the breach of a valid
collective bargaining contract between an employer and the bargaining contract between an employer and the bargaining "unit"
selected by his employees or certified as such under the provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act.' This section is designed
to protect employers from injuries caused by picketing in an
inter-union dispute over exclusive bargaining privileges. Certainly
the situation of an employer who has in good faith entered into
a collective bargaining contract with one union only to be picketed
by a rival union demands sympathy. The employer is on the horns
of a dilemma. If he refuses to breach his collective bargaining
agreement, he must bear the financial loss that picketing always
entails. Or, if he surrenders to the demands of the picketing
union, he will undoubtedly incur reprisals by the ousted union.
The legislature has sought to alleviate the plight of the employer
in this situation by forbidding conduct otherwise lawful when
carried on for the purpose of inducing a breach of a collective
bargaining contract. The constitutional question raised is whether
25

See e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105 1940; Carpenter and Joiners
Union v. Ritters Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 738 (1942).
26 See Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 295 (1943).
27
49 STAT. 44457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151-166 (1940).
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the legislature in prohibiting peaceful picketing has abridged the
constitutional right of freedom of speech.
That there is a limit to the constitutional protection afforded to
peaceful picketing is illustrated by the restrictions upheld in the
Mieadownoor Dairies and Ritter's Cafe cases. While no other
limitations have as yet been expressly recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, it is not unreasonable to assume that there
are other situations in which a state might be justified in forbidding peaceful picketing. One such situation may be where the
picketing is carried on to obtain an unlawful object.2" This is not
to say that a state is free to declare unlawful any object it chooses.
The exact limits of the unlawful purpose doctrine are hazy, and
it is probable that the gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion must run its course. This doctrine has many times been
applied by state and lower federal courts in enjoining peaceful
picketing " and some recognition of the unlawful purpose principle may be inferred from a dictum in the Wohl case." It may
well be that the Supreme Court will consider the interest of the
state in protecting a blameless employer from financial loss sufficient justification for a prohibition of picketing to secure the
breach of a collective bargaining contract. Certainly there is as
much or more justification for this restriction as that upheld in the
Ritter's Cale case. No objectien can be made that the statute is
28 RESTATEMENT. TORTS. §§ 775, 794 (1938': Larcon. May Peaceful Picketing Be
Enjoined? 22 Trx. L. REV. 392. 422 (19441 : Teller, Picketing and Free Speech. 56 HARv.
L. REv. 180, 209 11942).
29E.g., Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Amalgamated Assn. of Street Electric Ry. and
Motor Coach Employees, 74 F. Supp. 952 W. D. Ark. 19171. James v. Marinship. 155
P. (2d) 329 (Calif. S. Ct. 1944). Bautista and Macias v. Dairy Employees Union, 155 P.
(2d) 343 (Calif. S. Ct. 1944) : Burlington Transp. Co. v. Hathaway, 12 N. W. (2d 1 167
(Iowa S. Ct. 1943) :Fashioncraft v. Halpern. 313 Mass. 385. 43 N. E. (2d) I (Mass. Sup.
Jud. Ct. 1943) Lafayette Dramatic Productions v. Ferentz. 9 N. W. (2d) 57 (Mich. S.
Ct. 1943) ; Hobbs v.Poteet, 207 S. W. (2d ) 501 (.Mo. S. Ct. 1947) : Schwab v.Moving
Picture Machine Operators Local No. 159. 165 Ore. 602, 109 P. (2d) 600 (Ore. S. Ct.
1941) ; International Assn. of Machinists, Lodge 1488 v. Downtown Employees Assn.,
204 S. W. (2d) 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ oi error reIused no reVersible error by
Tex. S.Ct.; Retail Clerks Union v.Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. 242 Wis. 2i,
6N.W. (2d) 698 (Wis.S.Ct. 1942).
50 315 U. S.769. 774 (1942).
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too broad. An adequate definition of the prohibited activity is
contained in the statute, which is narrowly drawn to meet a specific abuse of picketing.
Section 4a prohibits the declaring, advertising, or publicizing
of continued picketing, actual or constructive, after such picketing
has been enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction. This section was probably intended by the legislature to prevent the circumvention of the restrictions imposed by the preceding section
relating to inter-union disputes. However, it would seem to apply
to any situation in which picketing has been enjoined. The section
seems to authorize punishment of persons who attempt to induce
a disregard of a court restraining order or who attempt to evade
a judicial prohibition of picketing by requesting the aid of labor
sympathizers in the observance of an imaginary picket line. It is
perhaps the last mentioned practice that was intended to be made
unlawful by the use of the term "constructive" picketing. This
term is not defined in the statute and has not acquired a definite
meaning from judicial usage. Such uncertainty in a penal statute
is unfortunate.
In summary, the constitutional prospects of the Texas Mass
Picketing Statute seem fairly secure. Limitation of the number
of pickets is within the police power of the state, and the rights
of freedom of speech and assembly are not substantially abridged.
The same can be said as to the prohibitions of intimidatory and
defamatory picketing and of interference with ingress and egress
from a picketed plant. Picketing in an inter-union dispute where
the employer has already contracted with a union representing
his men would appear to be an evil for which remedial legislation
may be constitutionally enacted. A balacing of interests of employers, unions, and the public may reasonably lead to the conclusion that the picketing should be enjoined, since this activity
is something more than free speech and causes financial loss.
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III.
The principle of the closed shop 3 originated in the craft guilds
of medieval England and was a part of the heritage of colonial
America. " Despite its ancient origin, there was surprisingly little
development of legal doctrines regarding problems raised by the
closed shop in the United States until the past four decades. Since
1903, when the National Association of Manufacturers formally
resolved that the open shop"3 was necessary to maintain "industrial safety, advancement, and supremacy,".. the closed shop has
been one of the most controversial issues of our time.
Proponents of the closed shop have argued that this type of
union security is both necessary and desirable to increase the bar.
gaining power of the individual worker, to protect employees
from anti-union activity by employers, and to compel all recipients
of the benefits of union activity to share the cost of unionism. On
the other hand, opponents of the closed shop denounce the qualification of the employee's right to work, the creation of an antisocial labor monopoly, and the denial to the employer of free
access to the employment market resulting from a closed shop.
The social, economic, and ethical concepts involved in a consideration of the merits or demerits of the closed shop are very complex. Because of the complexity of the problem it is not remarkable that state courts and legislatures have differed widely in their
attitudes toward the closed shop.
In colonial America attempts by workers to obtain a closed
shop were indictable as criminal conspiracies. Although the aspect
of criminality disappeared by the latter half of the Nineteenth
31 A closed shop (sometimes called an "all union shop") exists in a business establishment where all workers are required to be union members as a condition precedent to
being hired and must retain union membership as a condition of continued employment.
32To~.-Ei, THE CLOSED SHOP (American Council on Public Affairs, Washington,
D. C. 1942).
"3An open shop exists in a business establishment where both union and non-union
workers are employed free from discrimination. Advocates of labor claim, however, that
the open shop usually becomes the equivalent of a non-union shop-a shop in which union
workers are not employed.
34 Proceedings of the National Assn. of Manufacturers 62 (1903).
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century, activity by labor to secure a closed shop was until comparatively recently considered tortious in most jurisdictions. In
the period immediately preceding World War II, however, a majority of the states had, by statute or decision, recogni- .ed! ]clegality of the closed shop.35 The tenor of federal legislation at
this time also was favorable to the closed shop. Since the termination of hostilities, the legislative trend has been reversed, and a
substantial number of states have passed statutes or constitutional
amendments outlawing the closed shop." Among these states is
Texas, which outlawed closed shop contracts by statute in 1947.3"
IV.
The first section of the Texas Closed Shop Statute provides that
the inherent right of a person to work and to bargain collectively
or individually with his employer shall not be abridged by law
or by any organization. This broad statement is followed by a
specific declaration of public policy in the second section that no
person shall be denied employment on account of membership
or non-membership in a labor union.
The means for carrying these declarations of policy into effect
is found in Section 3. This section states that any contract requiring that employees or applicants for employment shall or shall
not be or remain members of a labor union shall be void and
against public policy. This section is not applicable to contracts
entered into before the effective date of the statute but applies only
op. cit. supra note 1, § 97.
AMEND. adopted Nov. 5, 1946 and Ariz. Laws, 1947, c. 81; ARK.
CONST. AMEND. No. 34 adopted Dec. 7, 1944 and Ark. Laws 1947, c. 101; FLA. CONST.
§ 12 (1944); Ga. Laws, 1947, ACL No. 140; Iowa Laws 1947, S. B. 109; Mr_ REv. STAT.,
c. 25, § 41-A as added by Me. Laws, 1947, c. 395; NEB. CoNsr. AMEND. adopted Nov. 5,
1946 and Neb. Laws, 1947, L. B. 347; N. H. Laws, c. 212, § 21 (1942), as amended by
N. H. Laws, 1947, c. 194; N. M. CONST. AMEND. adopted Feb. 24, 1947; N. C. Laws 1947,
H. B. 151; S. D. CONST. AMEND. Art. VI, § 2 adopted Nov. 5, 1946 and S. D. Laws, 1947,
S. B. 367; Tsr. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's Supp. 1947) Art. 5207a; Vs. Laws,
1947, c, 2.
37 T.x. Rxv. Crv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's Supp. 1947) Art. 5207a.
351 TELLER,

36 ARiz. CONST.
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to extensions or renewals of existing contracts and to any new
agreements.
The statute has been interpreted as outlawing any contract that
discriminates against employees solely on the basis of membership
or non-membership in a union.38 In view of this interpretation it
is desirable to list and define the types of agreements within the
purview of the statute:
A closed shop agreement requires that only union members be
hired and that union membership be maintained as a condition
of continued employment.
A union shop agreement requires that all who are hired become
union members within a specified period after their employment
and that union membership be maintained as a condition of continued employment.
A maintenance of membership agreement requires all who are
union members on an agreed date, and those who thereafter become union members, to maintain membership for the term of the
collective agreement as a condition of employment.
A "yellow dog" agreement requires that an employee resign
union membership, if a member, and remain unaffiliated with a
union as a condition of continued employment.
Whether or not the union preferential hiring agreement is
affected by the statute cannot be told with certainty. Such agreement requires an employer to show preference in hiring union
members but makes no condition precedent or subsequent regarding union membership.
The closed shop statute provides for no penalty to deter employers and unions from making one of the outlawed agreements.
How then is the legislative purpose to be effected? The answer
in part, is that the agreement is unenforcable in the courts because it is void and against public policy. The statute may also
be applied in conjunction with principles of tort law to give a
8 MARSHAL 0. BELL,
Lr LAutnF (1947).
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cause of action to an individual worker against the parties to a
contract which causes his dismissal or exclusion from employment.3 9 The statute may further serve as the basis for injunction
against strikes, picketing, or other anti-employer activity for the
purpose of obtaining a closed shop contract-an unlawful purpose.
In several states the constitutionality of anti-closed shop legislation has been questioned, but so far all statutes of this type have
been upheld."' The issue has not yet been decided by the United
States Supreme Court, and it is therefore appropriate to consider
the constitutional prospects of the Texas statute.
It would seem unlikely that the Texas Closed Shop Statute will
be held an improper exercise of the state's police power. Although
the issue is highly controversial, there seems to be sufficient basis
in fact to support a legislative determination that the public interest would best be served by making closed shop contracts illegal
and unenforceable. Ordinarily, a statute is constitutional unless
it is arbitrary, discriminatory, or rationally unconnected with the
evil sought to be remedied. The police power of the state is broad,
and a convincing argument can be made in support of anti-closed
shop legislation by drawing an analogy to statutory prohibitions
of "yellow dog" contracts, which have been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court.' If a state may properly prevent an employer from discriminating against union workers by the terms
of an employment contract, it would seem that a state may also
prohibit discrimination by an employer and a union against nonunion workers.
To the extent that the judicial process for the enforcement of
closed shop contracts is withheld, the Texas legislature does not
" See American Federation of Labor v. Watson, Atty. Gen., 327 U. S. 582, 598 (1946).
E.g., American Federation of Labor v. Watson, Attq. Gen., 60 F. Supp. 1010 (S. D.
Fal. 1945) rev'd on other grounds, 327 U. S. 582 (1946) ; American Federation of Labor
v. American Sash and Door Co., 189 P. (2d) 912 (S. Ct. Ariz. 1948) ; Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 13 C. C. H. LAB. CAs. No. 63,919 (Neb.
Dist. Ct. 1947); State v. Whitaker, 45 S. E. (2d) 860 (S. Ct. N. C. 1947); Mascari v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 209 S. W. (2d) 756 (Tenn. St. Ct. 1948).
41 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Natinal Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177 (1941).
40
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seem to have infringed constitutional rights. Only in respect to
the use of the statute as a basis for injunction against peaceful
picketing is there a serious constitutional question.12 However
there are grounds for belief that the "unlawful object" theory
may be sustained by the United States Supreme Court. In other
words, an injunction against peaceful picketing may be sustained
where individual and public interests have been weighed and the
purpose (the closed shop) has been declared unlawful by the
legislature.""
The doubt that anti-closed shop legislation is consistent with
federal law has been dispelled by the recently enacted LaborManagement Relations Act." Section 14b of the Act states:
"... .nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a,condition of employment in any state or territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by state or territorial
law."
It is clear from this statement that Congress has left the problem of the closed shop to be dealt with by the states, and it is
significant that fourteen states passed legislation outlawing the
closed shop in 1947." Perhaps it is well that the states be permitted to experiment with legislation in attempting solutions to
the problems arising from disputes over the closed shop.
William P. Barnes.

42 While upholding an anti-closed shop statute as a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power, the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to allow an injumction against peacefid picketing to obtain a closed shop contract in the case of Mascari v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 209 S. W. (2d) 756 (Tenn. S. Ct. 1948).
4-See notes 28-30 supra.
4461 STAT. 136-407 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §§ 141-197 (Supp. 1947).
" See note 36 supra.

